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1 Introduction
A key factor to the success of a firm is the extent to which employees work on tasks, or spe-
cialize, in accordance to their abilities. For example, law firms would like their associates
to specialize in a field of law that suits their talents, and large insurance companies would
like their associates with strong mathematical skills working in analysis, while associates
stronger with customer relations skills working in sales.
If firms have the same, or better, information about a worker’s abilities than the
worker has himself, we have the classic assignment problem studied in Rosen (1982) and
Waldman (1984a). However, if workers have private information about their abilities,
a new set of problems appear, where firms try to design schemes that make workers
voluntarily choose their eﬃcient task. One way of ensuring an eﬃcient choice of task is
for the firm to condition a worker’s wage on his marginal contribution to the firm. Barring
risk concerns, the worker then voluntarily chooses his eﬃcient task in order to maximize
his expected wage. However, for firms with complex production processes, there may not
exist a reliable (or verifiable) measure of an individual worker’s marginal contribution to
the firm. In this case, the firm must base payment on other measures.
This paper studies a setting where firms can only condition payment to a worker on
the worker’s choice of task and on his level of eﬀort. Given this restriction, a profit-
maximizing firm wishes to design a scheme that ensures an eﬃcient allocation of workers
without increasing costs. In a static setting, such schemes are simple to construct; simply
oﬀer the workers a wage that is independent of the worker’s task choice and give them a
small share of the firm. With this, all workers have an incentive to allocate themselves
eﬃciently.
In a dynamic setting it is not so easy, because career motives can disrupt this simple
solution. The worker not only cares about the immediate return from his current employer
(as a function of task choice), but also on the wage he expects tomorrow as a function
of his choice today. When workers are free to switch employers, such career concerns
create greater problems. For example, if the most-able workers choose task A, it may be
beneficial for a less-able worker, who would be more eﬃcient in task B, to also choose
task A, and thereby be associated with the most-able workers by the market. Notice that
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these career incentives are endogenous because they depend on the other workers’ task
choices.1 In this paper, we build a model to see when eﬃcient task choice can exist with
career concerns, and what type of wage contracts emerge when the eﬃcient task choice
can (or cannot) be implemented.
In the model, there are two types of workers, low and high, and two types of tasks
(specializations): ‘easy’ and ‘diﬃcult’. In the easy task, productivity is constant across
workers, while in the diﬃcult task, a high worker has a higher productivity than a low
worker. An eﬃcient allocation of workers occurs when low workers specialize in the easy
task, and the high workers specialize in the diﬃcult task. There are two periods. In the
first period, workers choose which firm to work for and which task to work on. The inside
firm knows with certainty which task each worker chose in period 1, while the outside
firm receives less information, through an imperfect signal. Hence, if workers allocate
eﬃciently in period 1, the inside firm has superior information to the outside firm about
the true ability of the workers in period 2. In the second period, the firms make oﬀers
simultaneously to each worker. Workers then choose the firm that gives them the best
oﬀer, and choose the eﬃcient task, since there is no incentive for misrepresentation in the
final period.
Let us briefly describe the main results. There are two types of equilibria: separating
and rationing. In separating equilibria, workers are given full discretion over which task to
undertake, and a wage scheme is designed such that eﬃcient tasks are chosen. When career
concerns of the low workers prevent the separating equilibrium, a rationing equilibrium
occurs where firms limit the fraction of workers performing the easy task. In equilibrium,
firms with a low degree of outside observability are characterized by a high degree of
discretion given to workers, while firms with a high degree of outside observability are
characterized by a low degree of discretion given to workers. The intuition for the result is
that a higher degree of market observability makes choosing the ‘prestigious’ diﬃcult task
more attractive for low workers. To counteract this eﬀect, the firm must limit the entry
to the easy task (and force workers to the diﬃcult task), in order to dilute the quality
1Hence we accommodate interactions in the incentives of individual workers that are not due to
contractual assumptions as in tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), or due to interdependent
preferences (as in Fershtman et al., 2001).
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of workers in the diﬃcult task, making these workers less attractive to outside firms. All
workers prefer a situation with low outside observability to a situation with high outside
observability, due to the more eﬃcient allocation of workers in a separating equilibrium.
The novelty of the present paper is to analyze an environment where workers have
private information about their abilities when hired and where there is an assignment
problem within the firm. There is a large literature that considers each of these issues
separately, and in the following we briefly describe this literature.
First, in the assignment literature, Gibbons & Waldman (1999) study an assignment
model with similar technology to that in our paper. However, there the inside firm
and the outside firm have symmetric information about worker abilities, hence there is
no strategic assignment.2 Bernhardt & Scoones (1993) and Bernhardt (1995) build on
Waldman (1984b) by considering job assignments when employers know more about the
abilities of their workers than other firms do. This creates incentives for employers to hide
their able workers from outside firms, by delaying promotion (leading to ineﬃciency). We
build on these papers by considering an environment where firms are not privy to the
workers’ knowledge and thus are concerned with designing schemes to induce workers to
choose specialization eﬃciently. Despite this concern, we find that firms still may set up
schemes that imply an ineﬃcient allocation of workers (by rationing) in order to avoid
the best workers being hired away. The second strand of literature considers adverse
selection in the labor market. This occurs when workers know more than firms about
their abilities, such as in Greenwald (1986) and Acemoglu & Pische (1998). However, this
literature focuses on the hiring decision, not on how firms should try to make workers
utilize their private information eﬃciently once hired.3
2Ignoring private information is also the case in the related literature on career concerns, as in Harris
& Holmstrom (1982) and Holmstrom (1982/1999). An exception is Hvide (2000), who considers an
education model where workers and firms learn asymmetrically about worker abilities. Another exception
is Prendergast & Stole (1996), which operates in a setting where firms do not redesign contracts in response
to the distortive career incentives.
3The multi-tasking literature (see Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), considers which tasks should be
included in the description of a job, and how to give incentives such that workers undertake tasks that
accord with the job description. Due to lack of worker private information, there is no notion of attempting
to exploit worker’s competence in designing jobs. More closely related is the work on authority by Aghion
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Since this paper uses auction theory as an important solution tool, it is related to a wide
range of theoretical and applied work on auctions. It is related to early theoretical work
by Wilson (1967) on bidding under asymmetric information; although, to our knowledge,
our analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction is novel. It is also related to recent work
that uses auction theory to determine equilibrium prices in settings that are not formally
defined as auctions, but where the process that determines equilibrium price can usefully
be understood through the lens of auction theory. Papers from this literature include
Bulow, Huang & Klemperer (1999) on takeover battles, Bulow & Klemperer (1999) on
dynamic competition between oligopolists, and Baye & Morgan (2001) on comparing
prices of objects are sold over the Internet to those through dealers. Klemperer (2000)
reviews this literature.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model, and in Section
3 we discuss the main results. We then discuss the relation between our results and the
recent trend towards greater worker discretion and responsibility in Section 4. Finally, we
conclude in Section 5. Note that we relegated certain proofs to Appendices A, B, and C.
2 The Model
Let us first provide a motivating example. Take a hi-tech firm developing software, whose
pool of programmers are of either (relatively) low ability or (relatively) high ability. The
firm wants the most talented programmers to work with creative tasks like software de-
velopment, and the less talented programmers to work with more administrative tasks,
like the updating of old software, customer relations and catalogue revision. However, the
engineers have private information about abilities, due to better information about the
factors that created their work history, and simply assigning workers according to their
claimed ability does not necessarily work. Instead, the firm attempts to design contracts
that exploits the private information of workers. Individual contribution to output can be
diﬃcult to measure in software development, since development of a new product often is
done in teams with extremely complex production processes. Under these conditions, the
firm can only condition wage on task choice and eﬀort level (for example, hours on the
& Tirole (1997). The relation to this paper is considered later.
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job). The question is what type of contracts will be provided in equilibrium, in a dynamic
setting, where workers having career motives in addition to caring about present wage,
and the implications for worker discretion, eﬃciency, turnover, and wage dynamics.
2.1 Technology and Contracts
There is a continuum of workers and two firms. Each worker privately knows whether he
has either low or high ability. The share of high ability workers, θ ∈ (0, 1), is publicly
known. In each firm, there are two tasks, skilled and unskilled, denoted by S and N.
Task N requires the eﬀort level eN to be completed (for both type of workers). Given
that eN is exerted, both workers have the same productivity in the N task, π0. Task S
requires the eﬀort level eS to be completed. Given that eS is exerted, the low type has
productivity πL in the S task, and the high type has productivity πH , where πL < πH .
For example, we can think of eﬀort as the time spent on doing a certain task and π as
the quality of the marginal product of a worker. We assume that the cost of eﬀort is
identical across workers. For simplicity, we normalize the cost of low eﬀort to zero, and
the cost of high eﬀort to c, i.e., c(eN) = 0, and c(eH) = c.4 Notice that if c is suﬃciently
high, a separating equilibrium will not be eﬃcient. We therefore confine attention to
the case c < πH − π0 (otherwise a pooling equilibrium is more eﬃcient). Likewise, if
π0 is suﬃciently low, then again a separating equilibrium will not be eﬃcient. To avoid
this, we assume that π0 > πL − c and thus (combined with the previous assumption)
πH − c > π0 > πL − c. We assume that (general) human capital acquisition results in
higher productivity in the second period. Label by π¯1 the productivities in the first period,
(πL, π0, πH). For convenience, we assume that the productivities in the second period,
the vector π¯2, are given by π¯2 = g(π¯1), where g(πL,π0, πH) = (πL + h, π0 + h, πH + h),
i.e., that the absolute human capital acquisition is uniform across workers and tasks.5
We assume that the only contractible variables are the workers choice of eﬀort and
4As can easily be seen, the case c = 0 makes the production technology of the model into a discrete
version of the production technology considered by Gibbons & Waldman (1999).
5Specific human capital acquisition has a similar eﬀect to introducing switching costs, in that any
positive level of turnover would be ineﬃcient. Proportional human capital acquisition, of the form π¯2 =
hπ¯2, where h > 1, would yield the same type of results as the specification chosen.
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their choice of task. Conditional on the correct eﬀort level being exerted, firms oﬀer one
wage for the S task and one wage for the N task.6 If an incorrect level of eﬀort is exerted,
it is assumed that the wage to a worker is zero. The case when individual output is
contractible is considered in Appendix C, where we show that our basic results (under
certain conditions) are robust to such a modification.
All workers and firms are risk neutral. For simplicity, we assume that if the incentive
scheme is such that a worker is indiﬀerent between doing the N task or the S task, he will
choose the eﬃcient task. This may be due to an (unmodeled) option plan, or alternatively
due to increased job satisfaction in the eﬃcient task.
2.2 Timing
In the first period, workers are born knowing their ability (high or low) and the two firms
compete in attracting them. Firms only know the probability of a worker being high (θ),
and furthermore are only able to commit to contracts lasting one period. Assuming that
workers exert the correct level of eﬀort, a firm oﬀers workers w1S for the S task and w
1
N
for the N task. Given the oﬀers, workers choose for which firm to work. Importantly,
before workers choose their task, a firm has the option to raise any of the wages {w1S ,
w1N} oﬀered. In other words, firms can commit to not lowering wages, but may choose to
raise one of them.7 Although such raises will not occur in equilibrium, it will turn out to
have an impact on equilibrium. Finally, workers choose task, and production takes place.
After the first period, the two firms bid for the workers. The inside firm (the worker’s
first employer) is assumed to be fully informed about the task choice of the worker.
The outside firm (the competitor of the worker’s first employer), however, receives some
public, imprecise, information about the task choice of the worker (and thereby on wages).
Formally, the public information about task choice is an independent realization of a
random variable X . For simplicity, it is assumed that X can take just two values, N
and S. If the worker is in N, then X = N occurs with probability p, and X = S occurs
6It may seem awkward that an oﬀer by a firm is a vector of wages, rather than just a wage. However,
we can interpret the vector as reflecting diﬀerences in overtime payment or fringe benefits between the
possible tasks.
7In technical terms, this is the criterion of renegotation-proofness.
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with probability 1 − p. But if the worker is in S, then X = S with probability p, and
X = N occurs with probability 1 − p. As usual, 1
2
≤ p ≤ 1, where the larger p the
more informative the signal is. Notice that p = 1 is the case of symmetric information
between the inside firm and the outside firm about which task the worker performed in
the first period. The case when first period wages can be observed, in addition to task, is
qualitatively similar, and will be discussed later on.
Given the informational structure, the inside firm and the outside firm compete for
the workers before the second period. We assume that the bidding follows a first-price
sealed-bid auction. In other words, each firm gives a single oﬀer to a worker, in ignorance
of the other firm’s oﬀer, and the worker accepts the highest oﬀer. The simultaneous
structure of the bidding process is realistic for situations where firms may bid in turn,
but where workers have no way of verifying the oﬀer made by one firm to the other firm.
Hence firms make secret or unverifiable oﬀers to workers, so that a worker cannot start a
‘bidding war’ by presenting one firm with the oﬀer from the other firm.8
Other papers model the competition for workers as a sequential auction.9 For example,
Greenwald (1986) and Acemoglu & Pische (1998) assume that the inside firm can always
match the oﬀer made from the outside firm. Such a structure creates a winner’s curse for
the outside firm so extreme that it oﬀers a wage assuming the worker has the lowest ability.
This leads all the workers to stay with the inside firm, unless the cost for switching to a
diﬀerent firm is negative, and hence this approach is unable to generate turnover without
adding assumptions about ‘utility shocks’. In contrast, our approach endogenously creates
turnover without assuming utility shocks (or firm heterogeneity).10
8It seems plausible to assume that firms can choose whether to give verifiable oﬀers to workers or not.
Hvide & Kaplan (2001) models such a situation and finds that neither the inside firm nor the outside firm
would wish to give verifiable oﬀers in equilibrium, in fear of starting a bidding war. That result provides
a justification for the use of simultanous auction rather than a sequential auction as wage determining
mechanism.
9Scoones & Bernhardt (1998) apply a (simultanous) ascending second-price auction as the wage setting
mechanism. But since there is no auctioneer present in the labor market, this auction form is essentially
just a technique to reproduce the full information, competitive wages.
10The important properties of the auction considered are those described in Proposition 1. Since it is
not transparent what the rules of the bidding game are empirically, it is comforting that these properties
are also satisfied in more general auction models, for example in certain hybrid versions of the auction
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3 Results
Recall that workers have no incentive to misrepresent themselves in the second period,
and hence choose their eﬃcient task in that period. We first present results that focus on
the separating equilibria, where both type of workers also choose their appropriate task
in period 1. We then examine cases where the equilibria are non-separating. For some
results, the proofs in the text confine attention to the cases p = 1
2
and p = 1, while the
case p ∈ (1
2
, 1) has been confirmed numerically.
In order to solve for the strategies in the first period, we use backward induction and
start out by analyzing the equilibrium bidding for workers in the second stage, given
that a separating equilibrium is played in the first stage. Recall that when the sorting is
eﬃcient at time 1, the inside firm knows the ability of a worker before the second period,
while the outside firm receives a noisy signal (whose reliability is p) about the task choice
of a worker.
Let w2N and w
2
S denote the expected second-period wage of a worker that chose the
respective N and S task in the first period (which equals the expected maximum second-
period oﬀer). For convenience, we derive the following result assuming c = h = 0.
Lemma 1 Given that a separating equilibrium is played in the first period,
(i) π0 ≤ w2N < w2S ≤ πH, with strict inequalities for p < 1.
(ii)
∂(w2S − w2N )
∂p
> 0.
Proof. For (i), see Appendix A, and for (ii), see Appendix B.
The intuition for (i) is that both the inside firm and the outside firm will bid more
aggressively for the high workers than for the low workers; the inside firm because it knows
the ability of a worker, and the outside firm because it receives an informative signal about
ability. Hence, the equilibrium wage in period 2 is higher for a high worker than for a low
worker, given that a separating equilibrium is played.11 The intuition for (ii) is that the
studied and the auction considered by Greenwald (1986). Notice, however, that the standard ascending
auction does not satify these properties (except with weak inequalities, see the previous footnote).
11When p = 1, the firms bid equally aggressively for both types of workers, and wage must equal
productivity for both types. When the signal is completely uninformative (p = 12), the high workers also
receive a higher wage than the low worker in the second period. In this case, the outside firm must bid
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outside firm will bid more aggressively for the workers with signal S the more informative
the signal, and in response the inside firm will also bid more aggressively for those workers
(and conversely for the workers with signal N). Hence an increased informativeness of
the signal X increases wage diﬀerences in period 2, given that a separating equilibrium is
played.12
Since the auction equilibrium is in mixed strategies, identical workers sometimes re-
ceive diﬀerent wages in the second period. Empirical work have found substantial hetero-
geneity in wage profiles for workers, controlling for match, education, years of experience,
and job level (see Gibbons & Waldman, 2000, for an overview). While this finding is
usually attributed to unobservable worker (or firm) heterogeneity, Lemma 1 shows that
such diﬀerences in wages may in fact result from equilibrium bidding behavior alone.13
The following proposition describes the contracts, wage dynamics and turnover of
separating equilibria.
Proposition 1 A separating equilibrium has the following properties:
• Workers are given full discretion over task choice.
• Low (high) workers get a wage that is higher (lower) than their marginal product in
both periods.
• Both type of workers have positive turnover, however, high type workers have a lower
turnover than low type workers.
For suﬃciently high c and h, a separating equilibrium satisfies:
• High workers earn more than low workers in both periods.
equally aggressive for both type of workers. The inside firm, however, bids more aggressively for the high
workers than for the low workers, since the former has a higher value to the firm.
12Despite the intuitive nature of Lemma 1, we were able to prove the second part analytically only for
θ = 1
2
, see Appendix B for details.
13If the auction were almost common value (see Klemperer, 1998), rather than common value, and had
a small private component, then the pure strategies in the resulting Bayes-Nash equilibrium will follow
these mixed strategies, arbitrarily closely. Thus, wage dispersion can also be attributed to privately
observed attributes that have an insignificant eﬀect on the value. For more on this issue, see Hvide &
Kaplan (2001).
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• Wages increase over time for both types of workers.
For not too large c or h, a separating equilibrium also satisfies,
• High workers have a steeper wage dynamics than low workers.
Proof. For the first part of the proof, we assume for brevity that c = 0 and h = 0.
Furthermore, we normalize by setting π0 = 0 and πH = 1. In order for a low worker to
choose the right task in the first period, the wage over a low worker’s career for choosing
the N task must be at least as large as the wage over the career for choosing the S task,
w1N + w
2
N ≥ w1S + w2S (1)
Applying the same argument for a high worker, such a worker chooses the right task if
and only if,
w1S + w
2
S ≥ w1N + w2S (2)
Combining (2) and (3), we get that a separating equilibrium implies that,
w1N + w
2
N = w
1
S + w
2
S (3)
If this condition does not hold, either a low worker or a high worker has incentive to
allocate himself ineﬃciently. The only way to ensure an eﬃcient allocation of workers is
to set wages such that (4) holds, and allow workers to choose their task. Hence workers
are given full discretion over task choice in a separating equilibrium.
That w2N > π0 and w
2
S < πH are shown in Lemma 1. We now show that w
1
S < πH
and that w1N > π0. As can be seen from the auction equilibrium described in Appendix
A, the maximum average profit per worker made by a firm in the second period (which
occurs for p = 1
2
) is equal to θ(1 − θ). It follows that the maximum average wage in
the first period equals θ + θ(1 − θ), due to the zero profit condition.14 As can easily be
14Zero profits across periods imply that,
2θ = (1− θ)(w1N +w2N ) + θ(w1S + w2S)
where 2θ is just the total productivity across periods, and the expression on the right hand side is the
total wage bill.
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seen from this expression, the maximum average wage in the first period cannot exceed
1. Furthermore, from Lemma 1 it follows that w1N > w
1
S in a separating equilibrium,
and hence w1S < 1. Second, the maximum average profit per worker in the first period is
0 (which occurs for p = 1), and hence average wages must exceed θ in the first period.
Since w1N > w
1
S, it follows that w
1
N > 0. Hence low (high) workers are paid more (less)
than their marginal productivity in both periods. The same type of argument applies for
c, h > 0. The turnover result is shown in Appendix A.
Now consider the second part of the proposition, where we introduce c, h > 0. Briefly,
c > 0 plays the role of ensuring that high workers are paid more than low workers in the
first period in a separating equilibrium, and h > 0 plays the role of ensuring that wages
are increasing through time for both type of workers.
Assume that there exists a separating equilibrium for the exogenous parameters {c =
0, h = 0, πH , π0, πL, θ} = Π1, given by the equilibrium wage vector {w1N , w1S , w2N , w2S} =
Ω1. Further suppose that there exists a separating equilibrium for the exogenous param-
eters {cˆ > 0, hˆ > 0, πH + cˆ, π0, πL, θ} = Π2, with equilibrium wages given by Ω2. Notice
that with cˆ > 0, firms must condition period 2 wages on task choice in period 2 (in ad-
dition to the information about task choice in period 1) to obtain eﬃcient allocation, in
contrast to the case when c = 0. Specifically, to obtain an eﬃcient allocation of workers
at time 2, firms will oﬀer the workers that choose the S task an ‘overtime payment’, or
bonus, of cˆ. The wage vector Ω2 is characterized by four elements, {wˆ1N , wˆ1S, wˆ2N , wˆ2S},
where wˆ1N (wˆ
1
S) is the period 1 equilibrium wage for a worker that chooses the N (S) task
in period 1, and where wˆ2N (wˆ
2
S) is the expected wage in period 2 when choosing the N
(S) task in period 1, conditional on choosing the N (S) task in period 2. We then have
that Ω2 = {w1N , w1S + cˆ, w2N + hˆ, w2S + cˆ+ hˆ}. The reason for this is twofold. First consider
the eﬀect of the human capital acquisition factor h. As can easily be confirmed from the
auction equilibrium of Proposition 1, the eﬀect of introducing h to second period wages
is simply to increase wages by h, independently of ability and independently of the task
choice. Moreover, wages in the first period are not aﬀected by h, because the wage dif-
ference in the second period is not aﬀected by h. Now consider the eﬀect of the positive
cost of eﬀort in the S task, cˆ. Taking into account the eﬀect of h, the productivities in
Π2 net of eﬀort is the same as the productivities in Π1. Therefore, taking into account
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h, the equilibrium wages net of eﬀort must be the same. It can easily be shown, and is
hence omitted, that given that a separating equilibrium exists for Π1, there must exist a
separating equilibrium for Π2.
To show that wˆ1S can be higher than wˆ
1
N , provided c large enough, notice that for a
separating equilibrium it must be the case that
wˆ1N + wˆ
2
N = wˆ
1
S + wˆ
2
S − 2c (4)
which holds if c > wˆ
2
S−wˆ2N
2
. However, since wˆ2S − wˆ2N < πH − π0, there must exist a range
of c such that a separating equilibrium exists (see Proposition 2), and moreover where
wˆ1S > wˆ
1
N . To show that wˆ
2
N (wˆ
2
S) can be larger than wˆ
1
N (wˆ
1
S) for high enough h is trivial
and hence omitted.
Now we prove the third part of the result, where we show that a high workers have a
steeper wage dynamics than a low worker in a separating equilibrium, provided c and h
are not too high. Define the slope of the wage dynamics of a low worker as,
ΨN =
w2N −w1N
w1N
(5)
and for a high worker as,
ΨS =
w2S − w1S
w1S
(6)
We show that ΨN < ΨS for c or h not too high. Clearly, for c = h = 0, the denominator
of ΨN is higher than the denominator of ΨS , since w1N > w
1
S in that case. Also, from
w1N > w
1
S and the fact that w
2
N < w
2
S it follows that the numerator of ΨN is smaller than
the numerator of ΨS . Hence it follows that ΨN < ΨS for c = h = 0. We now consider the
eﬀect of introducing c, h > 0 on Ψi. Assuming that a separating equilibrium exists for
c, h > 0, we have that
Ψ0N =
w2N +
h
1−c − w1N
w1N
(7)
and,
Ψ0S =
w2S +
h
1−c −w1S
w1S +
c
1−c
(8)
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As can easily be seen from these expressions, Ψ0S > Ψ
0
N for any c given that h is zero, and
Ψ0S > Ψ
0
N for any h given that c is zero. Ψ
0
S < Ψ
0
N requires that both c and h are larger
than zero.
Under separation, the low (high) workers have bad (good) career prospects, due to
the partial revelation of their abilities. To be willing to separate, low workers must be
compensated by a relatively high wage in the first period. Hence the wage profile of high
workers is steeper than the wage profile of the low workers. The reason why turnover rates
are lower for the high workers is that the inside firm will be more keen to keep such workers,
and will, due to asymmetric information, retain a larger share of high ability workers than
low ability workers.15 Hence there will be a ‘lemons problem’ in equilibrium, but not to
the extent that trade breaks down, as in Akerlof (1970).
Moreover, it is reassuring that Proposition 1 is consistent with (nominal) wage de-
creases being rare, and with increasing wage dispersion over time through time, both
strongly corroborated empirical findings from the careers in organizations literature (Baker,
Gibbs & Holmstrom, 1994a,b, and Gibbons & Waldman, 2000).
A central property of separating, eﬃcient equilibria is that they are ‘anarchistic’ in the
sense that workers themselves choose which task to work in, instead of being assigned to
one.16 As we will return to later, this seems to be a good approximation to what occurs
in knowledge-intensive firms, with individual workers having a great deal of discretion
with which projects to pursue. It is also consistent with the extensive use of matrix
organization through project groups, where the choice of project groups is to some extent
voluntary.
We now turn to characterize worker discretion when there does not exist a separating
equilibrium. First we explain the conditions for existence of a separating equilibrium in
the following remark.
15Since some workers receive the same oﬀer from the two firms before the second stage, the turnover
rate is indeterminate. The result described on turnover holds for any indiﬀerence rule chosen by workers.
16If the principal and the agents can communicate without costs, we could also construct separating
equilibria through the revelation principle, by letting the workers report their type to the principal. The
principal would then let payment be conditional on the report (w1N for a worker reporting that he is
the low type, and w1S for a worker reporting that he is the high type) and furthermore assign workers
according to their reported type.
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Proposition 2 A separating equilibrium is more likely to exist for lower p.
Proof. We start out by comparing the case p = 1/2 with the case p = 1, and show
that the conditions for existence of a separating equilibrium is more restrictive in the
latter case. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that c = h = 0 and θ = 1/2.
For p = 1, it follows that in a separating equilibrium, we must have that
w2N = π0
w2S = πH , (9)
By the zero-profit condition of firms and the incentive condition of workers to reveal their
type, we have
w1N = πH
w1S = π0 (10)
We now check under which circumstances these wage oﬀers are consistent with equilibrium
in the game between firms. Suppose that firm 1 sticks to the wage schedule (w1N ,w
1
S) and
firm 2 deviates by oﬀering the wage schedule (w’1N ,w’
1
S), where w’
1
S = w
1
S and w’
1
N < wN .
In that case, firm 2 would attract a share of the high workers while all the low workers
choose firm 1. Since w’1S is less than the marginal productivity of the high worker, firm
2 would run a profit, and hence the deviation (w’1N ,w
1
S) would be profitable. However,
suppose a low worker also chooses to work for firm 2. Taking this possibility into account,
firm 2 may wish to revise w’1N . Denote this revised oﬀer for w”
1
N . The point with oﬀering
w”1N instead of w’
1
N would be to give incentives for low workers to self allocate themselves
eﬃciently. The productivity gain from making a low worker choose the N task instead of
the S task would be π0 − πL. The wage increase required to make this low worker prefer
the N task to the S task would be w2S − w2N = πH − π0. Hence, a firm would prefer to
set w”1N = w
1
S + (πH − π0) = πH if
πH − π0 < π0 − πL (11)
But in that case, (w”1N , w’
1
S) = (w
1
N , w
1
S), and the deviation by firm 2 is not credible.
Hence, firm 2 cannot only attract high ability workers and does not have additional
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profits, and there exists a separating equilibrium when equation (7) holds. On the other
hand, when 2π0 < πL + πH , the firm can commit to setting w”1N < wN and hence only
attract high workers.
We now use the same type of argument as above to show that the conditions for
existence of a separating equilibrium is less restrictive when p = 1
2
than when p = 1.
Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists, and label the corresponding wages for (wˆ1N ,
wˆ1S , wˆ
2
N , wˆ
2
S). Then, since there is asymmetric information in the bidding before the
second stage,
wˆ2N > π0
wˆ2S < πH (12)
For a separating equilibrium to be played, zero profits (across the two periods) imply,
wˆ1N < πH
wˆ1S > π0 (13)
Suppose that firm 2 deviates by oﬀering the wage schedule (wˆ’1N ,wˆ’
1
S), where wˆ’
1
S = wˆ
1
S
and wˆ’1N < wˆN . The productivity gain from making a low worker choose the N task
instead of the S task would, as before, be π0 − πL. The wage increase required to make
a low worker prefer the N task to the S task would, however, be wˆ2S − wˆ2N < πH − π0.
Hence, a firm would prefer to set wˆ”1N = wˆ
1
S + (wˆ
2
S − wˆ2N ) = wˆ1N < πH if
wˆ2S − wˆ2N < π0 − πL, (14)
in which case a separating equilibrium exists. Since wˆ2S − wˆ2N < πH − π0, the condition
for existence of a separating equilibrium is less restrictive for p = 1
2
than for p = 1.
For general p, to prove the result it is necessary that w2S − w2N increases with p in a
separating equilibrium, which is shown in Lemma 1.17
17One may notice that an inside firm generates profits from a worker switching to the N task by both
the increase of eﬃciency and the usefulness of the knowledge gained. Why in deviation condition do
we only take into account the former and not the latter? The answer rests in that the gain from the
knowledge is solely from the outside firm’s beliefs about f . The outside firm’s strategy is a mixed strategy
with support starting from π0. An informed inside firm can extract all the surplus of his knowledge for
16
With an eﬃcient allocation of workers, the low workers get paid more than their
marginal productivity while the high workers get paid less than their marginal produc-
tivity, as shown in Proposition 1. This creates a potential incentive for firms to deviate in
order to attract only high workers, by lowering the wage for the N task. However, when it
is suﬃciently inexpensive for firms to make low workers choose the N task instead of the
S task, once workers have entered the firm, then a deviating firm cannot credibly oﬀer a
wage schedule that only attracts the high workers.
We now consider equilibrium when there does not exist separating equilibria. Such
equilibria entails that workers are given less discretion over task choice than in separating
equilibria.
Proposition 3 (i) If there does not exist a separating equilibrium, there exists a rationing
equilibrium, where the number of slots in the N task is restricted in each firm. (ii) There
does not exist a rationing equilibrium where the number of slots in the S task is restricted.
(iii) The degree of rationing is increasing in p.
Proof. We start out by proving the existence of a rationing equilibrium where the
number of slots in the N task is restricted, and then prove the impossibility of a rationing
equilibrium where the slots in the S task is rationed. Finally, we prove that the degree of
rationing is increasing in p. We start out by assuming p = 1 and then consider the case
p = 1
2
. The case p ∈ (1
2
, 1) is considered in Appendix B.
For p = 1, when π0 < (πL + πH)/2 then a deviating firm will have incentive to higher
the wage of the N task once the workers have chosen that firm, and hence there does not
exist a separating equilibrium. Suppose that a firm chooses a schedule so that the high
workers prefer to work in the S task, and the low workers prefer to work in the N task.
However, the firm allows only a fraction f of the workers that prefer the N task to enter
the N task. The complementary fraction of workers, (1-f ), is forced to work in the S task
(the admission to the N task is being allocated in a way such that the firm does not learn
an S task worker by placing a bid at π0 + ². Likewise, an uninformed inside firm can also make this bid
and lose ² for all the N task workers he would have avoided. As one can see, this extra cost is negligable
for small ². Thus, the inside firm’s value of information is actually worthless. All that matters is that the
outside firm thinks he has such information.
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the type of those workers that are not admitted to the N task). In that case, we still have
that
w1N + w
2
N = w
1
S + w
2
S
Moreover, second period wages must satisfy,
w2N = π0
w2S =
θπH + (1− θ)(1− f)π0
1− f(1− θ) (15)
Any value of f makes the equations consistent, and we now put restrictions on f . If f is
high, then a deviating firm can make a profit by the procedure described in the previous
result. On the other hand, if f is low, the firm will lose money on mis-allocation. So,
equilibrium is a situation where f is the maximal value that is consistent with there not
existing a profitable deviation. A deviating firm can only make a profitable deviation if,
w2S − w2N ≥ π0 − πL (16)
Hence f∗ is the value of f such that this condition holds with equality. Simplifying, we
get that,
f∗ =
(1 + θ)π0 − θπH − πL
(π0 − πL)(1− θ) (17)
Notice that when π0 >
πL+πH
2
, then f∗ > 1, and we get a separating equilibrium. The
case f∗ ≤ 0 is considered in a remark below.
We now prove (ii), that there cannot be rationing equilibrium where the number of
slots in the S task is restricted. If the number of slots in the S task is restricted, there
are two possibilities. First, it can be the case that both types wish to work in the S task.
In that case, the proportion of workers should be the same in both jobs. If this happens,
there are no career concerns since no information inferred by task choice. Because of this,
the firm can induce a high worker switch from the N task to the S task, by paying the
same wage in the S task as in the N task. Such a scheme would increase productivity
without increasing costs. So in equilibrium, it cannot be the case that both types of
workers wish to work in the S task. The second possibility is that the low type wishes
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to work in the N task, while the high type workers wish to work in the S task. In that
case, total wages must be equalized across tasks. But then, the firm can increase profits
by allowing a higher fraction of workers in the S task, by allowing workers to move from
the N task to the S task (since only high workers would wish to move). This occurs since
both the wage in the S task is lower than in the N task (since the fraction of high workers
in the S task is higher than in the N task) and productivity of high workers is higher
in the S task. Hence a situation where the slots in the S task is rationed cannot be an
equilibrium.
That the degree of rationing is higher for p = 1 than for p = 1
2
follows from a very
similar argument to why w2S − w2N is higher for p = 1 than for p = 12 (Proposition 2).18
The case with general p numerically yields the same type of results, and is considered in
Appendix B.
When there is incentive for a firm to deviate from a separating equilibrium, equilibrium
must have the feature that firms assign workers to tasks, in order to make the market
know less about ability through the worker allocation. An alternative interpretation of
rationing equilibria is that of job rotation; all interested workers are allowed to do the
easy job, but only a certain amount of time.19 The intuition for why there cannot be a
rationing equilibrium where the number of slots in the S task is restricted is that if S slots
are rationed then the firm could increase productivity without increasing costs, by letting
more (high) workers do the S task.
While in separating equilibria workers have full discretion over which task to choose,
there is also a certain discretion in rationing equilibria. There also exist equilibria where
the firms are unable to construct a scheme that makes workers exploit their private infor-
mation, and must force the workers to choose one of the tasks. This case is considered in
the following remark. We then consider welfare properties of the diﬀerent equilibria.
18The outline of the proof goes as follows. Given a certain degree of rationing, f, the wage diﬀerence
w2S −w2N is greater at p = 1 than at p = 12 . The wage diﬀerence w2S −w2N at p = 1 is also increasing in f .
Since the equilibrium f is the f such that w2S − w2N = π0 − πL, the equilibrium f has to be decreasing
from p = 1
2
to p = 1.
19Under this interpretation, the inside firm should only know the identity of a certain fraction of those
workers participating in job rotation.
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Remark 1 For p = 1, the rationing equilibrium can be a pooling equilibrium where all
workers are forced to work in the S task.
Proof. If p = 1, then oﬀering a wage of θπH+(1−θ)πL for the S task is an equilibrium.
If a firm tries to get workers to self-select at least partially, the second period wage for
workers who chose the S task must be greater than the wage for workers who chose the
N task by at least θπH + (1 − θ)π0 − π0 = θ(πH − π0). Productivity gain for each low
ability worker that switches tasks is π0−πL which is less than θ(πH −π0). Thus, there is
no incentive to try to get the worker to self-select. Also notice that (1+ θ)π0 < πL+ θπH
implies θπH + (1 − θ)πL > π0 (since πL < π0). Thus, one would not have incentive to
oﬀer a slightly higher wage to workers to take the N task.
Clearly rationing implies an eﬃciency loss, since some low workers are allocated to the
S task. Since a separating equilibrium is more likely to exist the lower outside observabil-
ity, we have the surprising result that a higher degree of competitiveness (higher outside
observability) for workers leads to reduced eﬃciency, due to the misallocation that occurs
from career concerns.
A related question is whether welfare of workers is improved or deteriorated when p
increases. Intuitively, one would think that at least the high workers prefer a high p to a
low p. We have the following result.
Proposition 4 Both type of workers prefer a low p to a high p.
Proof. We confine attention to comparing the case p = 1
2
to the case p = 1. First
notice that in all equilibria, the two types of workers enjoy the same level of lifetime
utility. Since firms make zero profits, and since allocation is more eﬃcient the higher level
of f , it is suﬃcient that f must be higher for p = 1
2
than for p = 1, which follows from
Proposition 1 and Proposition 3. The case with general p is considered in Appendix B.
The intuition for the result goes in two steps. First, notice that both types of workers
prefer a separating equilibrium to a rationing equilibrium. The reason is the following.
Total wages are equal across workers in both separating and rationing equilibria. And since
the total production of the firm is higher in a separating equilibrium than in a rationing
equilibrium, both type of workers must be better oﬀ in a separating equilibrium. And
since a separating equilibrium is more likely to exist for low p, both type of workers prefer
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a low p to a high p. We conclude that when ability becomes more observable, career
motives becomes a more serious obstacle to an eﬃcient sorting of workers. This result
should be contrasted to the results of Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982/1999), who
demonstrate how career concerns can promote eﬃciency.
In the present two-period model, direct wage information would not make a qualitative
diﬀerence since the inside firm is not informed about ability of a worker before bidding
at the first stage, and hence cannot reveal information about ability through the wage
oﬀer to a worker. Thus in a two-period setting, adding independent information about
wages for the outside firm to act upon would be equivalent to increasing p, and would not
make a qualitative diﬀerence to the results. In a three-period setting, however, the wage
oﬀered to a worker before the second stage would reveal information about the ability of
a worker, since the inside firm has private information at that point, and would open up
for strategic wage-setting. If (second-period) wages are observable, the inside firm knows
that bidding aggressively for a high worker before the second period has two eﬀects. The
first eﬀect, as before, is to increase the likelihood of retaining the worker. The second
eﬀect is to give the outside firm information that the worker is high, which is potentially
useful for the outside firm before bidding at the third stage. Specifically, if the outside
firm receives information that the second period wage of a worker was high, the outside
firm will bid more aggressively for that worker (before the third period). Assuming that a
separating equilibrium is played, the inside firm responds by bidding less aggressively for
high workers before the second period. Hence when the outside firm receives independent
information about wages, the wage diﬀerence between high and low workers in the second
period will be less (and also less in the first period). Apart from that, there would be no
qualitative diﬀerence to the results.
In the next section we consider numerical examples to illustrate the results.
3.1 Numerical example
We now present a typical numerical example, to illustrate the results of the previous
section.
Example 1 Suppose θ = 1/2, π0 = 1, πh = 6, πl = 1, c = 1, h = 1.
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Notice that even though gross productivity for a low worker is the same in the two
tasks, his net productivity is higher in the N task, due to the higher cost of eﬀort in the
S task. Let us now illustrate the equilibria of the example by the following figure.
.5 1
p| ||
.64
Separating eq Rationing eq Pooling eq
>
Figure 1
The figure depicts the structure of equilibrium for varying p. For a low p, there exists a
separating equilibrium where the worker allocation is eﬃcient and where welfare for both
type of workers is maximized, which confirms Proposition 1 and Proposition 4. When
p increases to .64, there only exists a rationing equilibrium, where slots in the N task
is restricted, due to the possibility of cream-skimming with separation: for a high p,
it becomes credible to pay a low wage for the N task, because it is expensive to make
low workers switch tasks in the interim. Therefore, on the interval (.64, 1) there exists
a rationing equilibrium where only a fraction f of those workers that prefer to work in
the N task are actually allowed to work in the N task (which confirms Proposition 3 (i)).
The fraction f is decreasing in p, due to the increased threat of cream-skimming (which
confirms Proposition 3 (iii)), and also welfare. When p goes to 1, the rationing equilibrium
becomes a pooling equilibrium, where no workers are allowed to enter the N task, which
confirms Remark 1.
High workers earn more than low workers in both periods, and both type of workers
experience a wage increase between the two periods (for suﬃciently high values of p).
Moreover, high workers have a steeper wage schedule than low workers, for any value of
p, and the turnover rate is higher for low workers than for high workers. These findings
confirm Proposition 1.
We summarize the findings of the example in the following remark.
Remark 2 For example 1, there exists a separating equilibrium for p < .64. For p > .64,
there exists a rationing equilibrium where only a fraction f of the low workers are allowed
into the N task. The fraction f is decreasing in p, and for p = 1 there only exists a pooling
equilibrium, where no workers are allowed into the N task. High workers earn more than
low workers in both periods, and for suﬃciently high values of p, both type of workers
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experience a wage increase between the two periods. High workers have a steeper wage
dynamics than low workers.20
4 Discussion
Here we first discuss the plausibility of separating equilibria in light of documented man-
agement practices, and then discuss the main empirical prediction of the paper, that
the degree of discretion given to workers should be decreasing in the degree of outside
observability.
Baron & Kreps (1999) reports on the management practices of Sun Hydraulics Corp.,
a company founded in 1970 to manufacture fluid power products. The founder of Sun,
Robert Koski, deemed standard management tools such as organization charts to be
destructive, by restricting worker initiative and information. To deal with such problems,
Koski designed the organization to eschew with almost all forms of hierarchy (to accord
with State of Florida law, there is a President and a Controller). As Baron & Kreps
(1999), p. 87, put it : ‘Work [at Sun] is self-organized. Natural teams have formed (and
reformed as necessary) spontaneously to organize work, but individual workers retain
20In the following table, we report the equilibrium wages and rationing fraction for varying p.
p f w1N w
1
S w
2
N w
2
S TL TH
.5 1 4.39 4.61 2.61 4.39 .75 .25
.8 .22 2.81 2.81 2.93 4.93 .54 .45
1 0 x 3.5 x 5 .5 .5
For p = .5, there is a separating equilibrium where w1N is the wage oﬀered to workers entering the N
task, and w2N is the expected wage in the second period conditional on choosing the N task in the first
period. As can easily be verified, expected payment subtracted the cost of eﬀort c, is identical for the
two tasks. TL is the turnover rate for the low type workers and TH is the turnover rate for the high type
workes. Since .75>.25, the turnover rate is higher for the low type workers.
For p = .8, there is a rationing equilibrium where f is the fraction of low workers permitted into the
N task and where w1N is the wage in the first period conditional on being admitted into the N task, and
w2N is the expected wage in the second period conditional on being admitted to the N task in the second
period and on choosing the N task in the second period. That the wage dynamics is steeper for high
workers than for low workers for the given values of p can be easily verified.
The program used for generating the numbers is available on request from the authors.
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the right and responsibility to choose how they spend their own time.’21 In 1997, its
products apparently enjoyed a higher margin than competitors, and had a reputation for
outstanding quality.22
The model fits to several features of Sun. The model predicts that full discretion,
separating equilibria are more likely to occur the lower outside observability. And Sun
seems to be characterized by both a high degree of worker discretion and a low outside
observability. For example, since job titles are non-existent at Sun, and the pay to in-
dividual workers is covert (Baron & Kreps, 1999, p. 295) it is hard for outside firms
to assess the productivity of a single employee. As a consequence, Sun probably has to
worry less about being outbid for inside workers than standard firms, due to the large
winner’s curse problem associated with bidding for Sun’s workers. Furthermore, the win-
ner’s curse problem favors a low turnover at Sun, compared to firms with a higher outside
observability, which accords with findings by Kaftan (1984).23
The model seems to capture some important aspects of modern personnel manage-
ment, as exemplified by the (arguably extreme) practices of Sun Hydraulics. Importantly,
these aspects are not covered by standard principal-agent models of organization, which
emphasizes assignments to tasks rather than worker discretion.
There are other features of the human resource practices at Sun that our model is not
rich enough to capture. For example, since production in the model is separable in the
contribution of each worker, there is no notion of duplication of work between workers.
In reality, such coordination costs seem important: in expansion periods both Sun and
Gore seem to prefer ‘cloning’ existing plants rather than expanding them (Kaftan, 1984,
21The degree of discretion given to workers at Sun can be illustrated by a case where an engineer had
been hired with a product development function in mind but had ‘become intrigued with the computer in
his first days on the job, and since had concentrated entirely on creating new programming applications.’
(Kaftan, 1985).
22The following statement from W. L. Gore, founder of Gore & Associates (which produces the Gore-
Tex c° products) is an echo from Sun: ‘In Gore & Ass., one of our basic principles is to encourage
maximum freedom for each employee. There is no need for bosses, assignment of tasks, establishing lines
of command, defining channels of permitted communication, and the like’ (Gore, 1990).
23The pay policy at Sun seems to accord quite well with the absence of performance contracts in the
model: ‘Contrary to industry wide practices there would be no standard production times or procedures
and no piece rate pay incentives at Sun Hydraulics’ (Kaftan, 1984).
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and Gore, 1990).24
At a more general level, it is interesting to link our work to developments in the
organization of work. Here, an important recent trend includes the increased use of
team work and job rotation, blurring of occupational barriers, a reduction in the number
of management levels, decentralization of responsibility, and increased participation of
employees in decision making such as through self-directed work teams and quality groups
(Osterman, 1994, and Lindbeck & Snower, 1996, 2000, 2001). In short, we can refer to
this development as increased worker discretion (or authority).
From the present paper, we expect that degree of worker discretion for a given job
level within a firm to be decreasing in the degree of outside visibility, since greater outside
visibility means that the most able workers need to be hidden through some degree of
assignment. We are not aware of any empirical studies on the relation between the degree
of visibility and the degree of worker discretion. Casual observation gives some support
to our hypothesis. First, in hi-tech firms (such as Sun Hydraulics), where the line of
operations commonly are suﬃciently diﬀuse to make outside bidding for workers diﬃcult,
a high degree of discretion to workers is often implemented. On the other hand, in more
traditional firms, the line of operations (and the tasks undertaken by individual workers)
is more visible, and some degree of assignment is undertaken, as in standard principal-
agent models. Second, based on survey data, Osterman (1994) reports that (p. 381) ‘It is
also apparent that higher-level employees have much more autonomy than do blue-collar
workers.’ Since the tasks of higher-level employees typically are harder to observe from
the outside than that of blue-collar workers, this finding also seems confirmatory of our
hypothesis.
A more thorough empirical investigation should take into account that firms with
a high degree of discretion are typically rather small, which suggests that coordination
costs are important in determining degree of worker discretion.25 It should also take
24Coordination costs are also emphasized by the human resource literature (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts,
1990, Baron & Kreps, 1999) as a negative aspect of decentralization.
25In a large firm, it is more diﬃcult for workers to have knowledge of who is doing what.
One can see this in a diﬀerent context— as researchers, we enjoy almost full discretion on the projects
that we attempt. Naturally, we try to avoid duplicating work of others. In a smaller field, it is easier to
avoid this possible duplication since it is easier for us to be aware of all of our colleagues’ working papers.
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into account that diﬀerent types workers are less mobile than others. For example, older
workers can be expected to have higher moving costs than younger workers. This should
make firms less anxious about older workers being bid away, and hence we can expect
a more eﬃcient allocation within the firm for older workers than for younger workers,
controling for the fact that more is known about the ability of older workers.
5 Conclusion
One of the basic questions in labor economics is whether the employee defines the job or
whether the job defines the employee (Lazear, 1995). Traditional human capital theory,
such as expressed by Mincer (1974), tend to think of workers as carrying their skills to
the workplace, and the job as being of minimal importance in determining productivity; a
description of the job is simply not included in the theory. In contrast, more institutional
views of the labor market, as in matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979), or in principal-agent
theory expressed by Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991), a well-defined
description of a job comes first, and workers are simply hired to fill the vacant slots. This
paper, instead of taking a stance on which comes first, lets the relation between a worker
and a job be endogenous.26
One type of equilibrium in the model (separating equilibrium) is characterized by
the firm hiring workers and then giving them full discretion in defining their job, while in
other types of equilibria, the firm constructs a scheme where the worker discretion is either
limited (rationing equilibrium) or absent (pooling equilibrium). There are two underlying
forces that determine the equilibrium degree of worker discretion. On one hand, workers
having private information favors the worker coming first, because the worker is then
26Aghion & Tirole (1997) models a diﬀerent type of setting where degree of worker discretion, or au-
thority, is endogenous. Under P-authority, the principal chooses which project the firm should implement,
while under A-authority, the agent chooses the project. The basic trade-oﬀ determining whether a firm
will be characterized by P-authority or A-authority is that giving the agent more discretion increases
his eﬀort but also increases the probability that a bad project (from the principal’s viewpoint) is imple-
mented. In a similar setting to Aghion & Tirole (1997), Zabojnik (2001) argues that worker discretion
could be high even in a situation where the principal is better informed, due to problems with enforcing
the first best contract under limited liability.
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better able to judge his appropriate task. On the other hand, career concerns create
problems, because a worker may have incentives to create his job in a fashion that makes
him look good to the market rather than a job that coincides with the best interest of the
firm.
When the outside observability is low, the career motives are weak, and the firm
can construct a scheme that gives workers full discretion over defining their job, and an
eﬃcient allocation of workers follows. When the outside observability is high, however,
the career motives are strong, and the firm must define the job for the worker, and a
misallocation of workers follows. Hence, we find firms with high outside observability to
have a low degree of discretion to workers, and firms with low outside observability to
have a high degree of discretion to workers. This conclusion seems to have some empirical
support, but more research is called for.
There are several other paths for future research. One would be to view the degree
of outside observability as a choice variable for the firms. This could create the trade-oﬀ
that less observability implies less compensation costs to able workers, but also increased
coordination costs inside the firm due to e.g., duplication of work. Another possible
extension would be to consider whether increased worker discretion can lead to a higher
innovation rate, both with respect to product and work method improvements. This
would include what is possibly another motivation for free management practices — such
practices lead to an improved innovation rate compared to more standard organizations.
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7 Appendix A: Auction equilibrium
Proof. of Proposition 1.
Clearly there cannot exist a pure strategy auction equilibrium. We here derive the
mixed-strategy equilibrium. Consider first the equilibrium oﬀers for a worker who receives
a good signal. Let us say that the outside firm uses a mixed strategy with cumulative
distribution Gg(x) and support Sgoutside = [π0, π¯
g ], where π¯g < πH . The inside firm will
also use a mixed strategy with cumulative distribution of Fl for the low worker and Fh
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for high worker. For a low worker, FL will simply be the distribution degenerate at π0.
As can easily be shown, Sginside = S
g
outside = S
g. Given that the inside firm oﬀers x to a
high worker with a good signal, the inside firm will get,
Gg(x)(πH − x), x ∈ Sg (A1)
where Gg(x) is the probability that the inside firm will win the auction, and (πH − x) is
the surplus he gets in the case he wins. Since the inside firm must be indiﬀerent at all
points in his support, we have that,
Gg(x)(πH − x) = kginsideh, x ∈ Sg (A2)
where kginsideh is a constant. By integration, this constant equals the profits the inside
firm makes on high workers that get a good signal. Now define the probability of a worker
being a high type conditional on a good signal as θg and the bad signal as θb. As can
easily be verified,
θg =
pθ
pθ + (1− p)(1− θ)
θb =
(1− p)θ
p(1− θ) + (1− p)θ (A3)
Given that the outside firm oﬀers y to a worker with a signal i, the outside firm will get,
θgF gh (y)(πH − y) + (1− θg)F gl (y)(π0 − y), y ∈ Sg (A4)
By the same argument as for the inside firm, the outside firm must be indiﬀerent at all
points in his support. From Milgrom (1981), we know that the profits of the outside firm
must be zero. Hence the above expression must be zero. By inserting for y = π¯g, we can
determine the upper end of the support, π¯g, as,
π¯g = θgπH + (1− θg)π0 (A5)
We now determine the cdf’s. From (A2) and inserting for x = π¯g in (A1) to get kginsideh =
πH − π¯g, we get that,
Gg(x) =
πH − π¯g
πH − x , where x ∈ S
g (A6)
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Notice that this cdf places an atom at x = π0, where the magnitude of the atom equals
πH − π¯g
πH − π0 . To determine F
g
h , insert for F
g
l = 1 in (A4) to get,
F gh (y) =
1− θg
θg
y − π0
πH − y , y ∈ S
g (A7)
Notice that this distribution does not place an atom at the lower end of the support. For
a worker with a bad signal, we use exactly the same procedure to get,
Gb(x) =
πH − π¯b
πH − x , where x ∈ S
b (A8)
where the magnitude of the atom at x = π0 equals
kginsideh
πH − π0 . Notice that we have that,
kbinsideh > k
g
insideh > 0, (A9)
since π¯g > π¯b = θbπH + (1− θb)π0. Hence, as expected, the informed firm makes a higher
profit on a (high) worker that receives a bad signal than a (high) worker that receives a
good signal. Finally, we get,
F bh(y) =
1− θb
θb
y − π0
πH − y , y ∈ S
b (A10)
which is an atomless distribution. Now the equilibrium (expected) wage for an agent
of type i. Clearly his expected wage just equals the expectation of the maximum oﬀer
conditional on the signal. First a low ability person. His expected wage equals,
w2N = π0[p(1− θb) + (1− p)(1− θg)] + p
Z π¯b
π0
zgb(z)dz + (1− p)
Z π¯g
π0
zgg(z)dz > π0
(A11)
since the oﬀer from the outside firm fully determines his wage. On the other hand, the
expected wage for a high ability person equals,
w2S = p
Z π¯g
π0
zdGg(z)F g(z) + (1− p)
Z π¯b
π0
zdGb(z)F b(z) < πH (A12)
Uniqueness follows directly from the argument.
Proof. of Proposition 2 (Turnover part)
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The turnover rate for the low workers equals the fraction of low workers that receives
a (strictly) higher bid from the outside firm than from the inside firm at time 2, and half
of the workers that receive the same oﬀer from the two firms. Recall that the inside firm
always bids π0 for the low workers. Hence TL equals,
TL = p[1− 12Gb(π0)] + (1− p)[1− 12Gg(π0)]
=
1
2
+
θbp + (1− p)θg
2
(A13)
where θb and θg are defined as in the previous proof. It follows immediately from (A13)
that this expression is positive. Now to the turnover rate of the high workers, which
equals,
TH = p
Z π¯g
π0
F g(z)dGg(z) + (1− p)
Z π¯b
π0
F b(z)dGb(z)
=
θgp + (1− p)θb
2
(A14)
As with the low workers, it follows immediately from the expression that the turnover
rate for the high agents is positive. Notice that both TL and TH , and hence total turnover,
are increasing in θ, since both θb and θg are increasing in θ. Expressing the diﬀerence, we
find that,
TL − TH = 1
2
+
θbp + (1− p)θg
2
− θ
gp + (1− p)θb
2
=
1
2
+ θbp +
1
2
θg − θgp− 1
2
θb
=
1
2
+ (p− 1
2
)(θb − θg) (A15)
Since the second term on the right hand side always exceeds (-
1
2
), the turnover is always
higher for the low type workers than for the high type workers. Intuitively, if the realiza-
tion of the signal is N, the inside firm bids π0 if the worker is low, and F
g
h (y) if the worker
is high. So, conditional on the signal being N, the turnover is higher for low workers than
for high workers. The same type of argument applies if the value of the signal is S.
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8 Appendix B
In this appendix, we numerically analysis of the claims made in Lemma 1 and Proposition
3, part (iii).27 First, for the claim of Lemma 1, we show that ∆w2 := w2S−w2N is increasing
in p (from which Proposition 2 follows). Second, for the claim of Proposition 3, we show
that the degree of rationing is increasing in p.
8.1 Existence of separating equilibrium
To show that a separating equilibrium is more likely to exist the lower p (Proposition 2),
we need to check that ∆w2 := w2S − w2N is increasing in p (the higher this amount the
lower the incentive for firms to induce low-skilled workers to switch from the diﬃcult task
to the easy task).28
We start out by simplifying ∆w2, then prove analytically that
∂∆w2
∂p θ= 1
2
is increasing
in p, and finally consider numerical analysis for general θ. From Appendix A, we know
that,
w2N = π0[p(1− θb) + (1− p)(1− θg)] + p
Z π¯b
π0
zgb(z)dz + (1− p)
Z π¯g
π0
zgg(z)dz > π0
(B1)
and that,
w2S = p
Z π¯g
π0
zdGg(z)F g(z) + (1− p)
Z π¯b
π0
zdGb(z)F b(z) < πH (B2)
Observe that,Z π¯i
π0
zdGi(z) = (πH − π0)(1− θi)
Z π¯i
π0
zd(
1
πH − z )
= (πH − π0)(1− θi)
·
z
πH − z + ln(πH − z)
¸πi
π0
= πHθ
i + (πH − π0)(1− θi)ln(1− θi) (B3)
27All calculations and graphs are generated in Maple V. The worksheets are available from the authors.
28The reason why it is diﬃcult to prove analytically that ∆w2 is increasing in p is that while w2S is
always increasing in p, surprisingly w2N is not always monotonic in p.
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where i = b, g, and where θb, θg are as in equation (A3). We can use (B3) to simplify w2N
into,
w2N = π0 + (πH − π0)
£
p(θb + (1− θb) ln(1− θb)) + (1− p)(θg + (1− θg) ln(1− θg))¤
= π0 + (πH − π0)
£
pθb + (1− p)θg¤+
(πH − π0)[p(1− θb) ln(1− θb) + (1− p)(1− θg) ln(1− θg)] (B4)
Moreover notice that,Z π¯i
π0
zdGi(z)F i(z) = πH(2θ
i − 1) + 2π0(1− θi)− (1− θ
i)2
θi
(πH − π0) ln(1− θi) (B5)
Hence,
w2S = 2π0 − πH + 2(πH − π0)(pθg + (1− p)θb)−
(πH − π0)[p(1− θ
g)2
θg
ln(1− θg) + (1− p)(1− θ
b)2
θb
ln(1− θb)] (B6)
We then have that,
∆w2 = w2S − w2N = π0 − πH + (πH − π0)[(3p− 1)θg + (2− 3p)θb]−
(πH − π0)[(1− θg)( p
θg
+ 1− 2p) ln(1− θg) + (1− θb)(1− p
θb
+ 2p− 1) ln(1− θb)]
= π0 − πH + (πH − π0)[(3p− 1)θg + (2− 3p)θb]−
πH − π0
θ
[(1− θg)(1− p) ln(1− θg) + (1− θb)p ln(1− θb)] (B7)
Notice that for θ = 1
2
, we have that θg = p and θb = 1− p, and hence (B7) reduces to (we
normalize by setting π0 = 0 and πH = 1),
∆w2
θ= 1
2
= −1 + (3p− 1)p+ (2− 3p)(1− p)− 2[(1− p)2 ln(1− p) + p2 ln p] (B8)
Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to p we obtain,
∂∆w2
∂p θ= 1
2
= 4[(1− p) ln(1− p)− (1− p)− (p ln(p)− p)] > 0 (B9)
This expression is greater than zero because xln(x) − x is decreasing in x for x ∈ (0, 1).
Hence we have shown that ∆w2 is increasing in p for θ = 1
2
. We expect a proof of the case
with general θ to be along the same lines, but significantly more cumbersome. In absence
of an analytical proof, we now plot ∆w2 for other values of θ (still using the normalization
π0 = 0 and πH = 1),
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Figure 2
The figures depicts ∆w2 as a function of p for θ = .1 (bottom line), θ = .3, θ = .5,
θ = .7, θ = .9 (top line). As can be seen from the figure, ∆w2 is increasing in p for all the
values of θ. This finding has been confirmed by extensive numerical analysis.
8.2 Rationing increases with p
We now show that the degree of rationing is increasing in p, or in other words that f∗ is
decreasing in p (Proposition 3 (iii)).
Denote the wages in the second period of a rationing equilibrium as wˆ2S and wˆ
2
N .
To determine wˆ2S and wˆ
2
N , we work with the same equations as before, except that θ is
replaced by θˆ, and πH is replaced by πˆH , where
θˆ = θ + (1− f)(1− θ)
πˆH =
θπH + (1− f)(1− θ)π0
θ + (1− f)(1− θ) (B10)
where θˆ is the expected share of workers that choose the S task in the first period, and
where πˆH is the expected productivity of those workers in the second period (since workers
choose their eﬃcient task in the second period, πL does not enter the expression). As
explained in the proof of Proposition 3, the equilibrium f∗ is the value of f such that the
wage diﬀerence wˆ2S − wˆ2N equals π0 − πL. Hence,
f ∗ = {f : wˆ2S − wˆ2N = π0 − πL} (B11)
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For the expressions we have checked, f ∗ is unique, and we expect this to hold generally.
We now plot f∗ against p, using (B8), (B10), and (B11), and insert the parameter values
used in Example 1, except that we let θ be a free parameter (in addition to p).
Figure 3
The figure plots f ∗ against p for varying values of θ [θ = .3 (top line), θ = .5, θ = .7,
and θ = .9 (bottom line)]. The figure shows that f∗ is decreasing in p for all values of θ.
Extensive numerical analysis confirms that point. Hence we have substantiated that the
degree of rationing is increasing in p.
9 Appendix C: Performance Contracts
Our justification for not having (a measure of) individual performance as a contractible
variable is that for many production processes, measuring individual contribution to prof-
its that go beyond the measurement of eﬀort can be very costly and noisy task. Moreover,
the assumption is consistent with a large empirical literature that shows that real-life pay-
ment schemes to a little extent depends on such measures (see Prendergast, 2000). The
purpose of the appendix is to show that even when individual output is contractible, the
equilibrium contracts can be similar or identical to the (fixed-wage) contracts analyzed
in the main text. We illustration, we consider the case when eﬀort is supplied inelasti-
cally, and where the wage to a worker can only be made conditional on a measure of his
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individual output.
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one period, and moreover that c = 0. To
make our task harder, we assume a very weak form of risk aversion: workers maximize
expected (total) wages, but for a given level of (expected) wages, workers prefer a lower-
risk scheme to a higher-risk scheme.29 If workers are indiﬀerent given this criterion, they
choose their eﬃcient task.
From the assumptions made on risk preferences, we can confine attention to contracts
of the following (linear) form,
w = β0 + βY Y (C1)
where Y is the (observed) output of an agent, β0 is the salary, and βY is the bonus. We
assume that in the N task, the output π0 is certain, while the output in the S task is not
perfectly observable. Yi has two possible levels, πg and πb,where πb < πH < πg. An H
worker in the diﬃcult task has a pH probability of πg, while an L worker in the diﬃcult
task has a pL probability of obtaining πg, where pL < pH . We assume that,
pHπg + (1− pH)πb = πH
pLπg + (1− pL)πb = πL (C2)
As can readily be seen, the deterministic technology studied in the previous sections is
obtained for the special case pH = 1, πg = πH , pL = 0, and πb = πL. We have the
following result.
Proposition 5 For suﬃciently high π0 equilibrium contracts will be arbitrarily close fixed-
wage (as in the main part of the paper).
Proof. We assume that there exists an equilibrium where the L workers choose the
N job and get the wage π0, while the H workers choose the S job and get the scheme
w = β0 + βY Y . For (β0, βY ) to be consistent with equilibrium, it must maximize the
utility of the high type, given zero profits and given that the low type prefers to work in
29More general risk preferences give qualitatively the same type of result, but would add technical
problems with existence of equilibrium (similar to in Rotschild & Stiglitz, 1975)
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the N job. Self-selection of low workers implies that,
β0 + βY (pLπg + (1− pL)πb) ≤ π0 (C3)
while zero profit in the S job implies that,
β0 + βY (pHπg + (1− pH)πb) = πH (C4)
The second condition determines the salary as,
β0 = πH(1− βY ) (C5)
Since high workers prefer a lower risk to a higher risk, the self-selection constraint is
binding, and we get that,
βY =
π0 − β0
pLπg + (1− pL)πb (C6)
Solving the system, we get that equilibrium contracts (β∗0, β
∗
Y ) must satisfy,
β∗0 =
πH(πb + pLπg − πbpL − π0)
pLπg + πb − πH − πbpL
β∗Y =
π0 − πH
pLπg + πb − πH − πbpL (C7)
From those expressions, it can easily be seen that (β∗0, β
∗
Y ) converges to (π0, 0), as π0
approaches πH .
Intuitively, when π0 is high, the self-selection constraint becomes easier to satisfy, and
hence βY can be lowered and still self-selection occurs. When π0 approaches πH , we get
that βY can be close to zero without self-selection being violated, and since workers are
risk averse, the equilibrium βY will in fact be close to zero as π0 increases.
Since there is no intrinsic reason why π0 should be close to πH , the result does not
seem too strong. However, by adding a cost of monitoring, m, where 0 < m < πH − π0,
for obtaining a performance measure, one can add realism to the result. As can easily be
verified, the result is that when m is suﬃciently high (so that πH − π0 is close to zero),
the equilibrium performance contracts are close to the (fixed-wage) contracts considered
in the previous sections.
Even if the suﬃcient condition outlined in Proposition 5 does not hold, there are
circumstances under which performance contracts will not be used in equilibrium even if
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individual output is contractible. One set of circumstances is when workers can commit
ex-ante to contractual form (e.g., through labor unions), as the following result shows.
Proposition 6 If workers can commit to contractual form ex-ante to discovering their
ability, equilibrium contracts may consist of fixed wages even if performance contracts were
available.
Proof. Assume that (0 < pl < (πn − πb)/(πg − πb) < ph < 1), that is, for eﬃciency
H workers should be in the S job, while L workers should be in the N job. In addition,
assume that the proportion ofH workers θ is such that θ(phπg+(1−ph)πb)+(1−θ)(plπg+
(1− pl)πb) ≤ πn; that is, it is better that all the workers go in job N than all the workers
going into job S. (This helps guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium.) If
firms competed over contingent contracts for the workers wages over workers in job N
would be paid πn and workers in job S would be paid w∗g , w
∗
b that solves
max
wg,wb
Euh(wg, wb)
s.t. phwg + (1− ph)wb ≤ phπg + (1− ph)πb)
Eul(wg, wb) ≤ u(πn) (C8)
This type of equilibrium is similar to Rothschild & Stiglitz (1975) except we include
the moral-hazard of job selection as well. If one cannot write contracts contingent upon
outcome, then the equilibrium contract would be w∗ such that w∗ = θ(phπg+(1−ph)πb)+
(1− θ)πn. Notice that when workers are risk-averse u(w∗) > θEu(wg, wb) + (1− θ)u(πn).
Such a contract cannot occur when contingent contracts are available, since one would be
able to skim the good workers. This implies that it is best for the ex-ante for the workers
to prevent contingent contracts.
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